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Abstract: What is the relevance of ideals for determining virtuous argumentative practices?
According to Bailin and Battersby (2016), the telos of argumentation is to improve our
cognitive systems, and adversariality plays no role in ideally virtuous argumentation.
Stevens and Cohen (2019) grant that ideal argumentation is collaborative, but stress that
imperfect agents like us should not aim at approximating the ideal of argumentation.
Accordingly, it can be virtuous, for imperfect arguers like us, to act as adversaries. Many
questions are left unanswered by both camps. First, how do we conceptualize an ideal
and  its  approximation?  Second,  how  can  we  determine  what  is  the  ideal  of
argumentation? Third, can we extend Stevens and Cohen’s anti-approximation argument
beyond virtue  theory?  In order  to  respond to  these  questions,  this  paper  develops  a
second-best perspective on ideal argumentation.  The Theory of the Second Best is a
formal contribution to the field of utility (or welfare) optimization. Its main conclusion
is that, in non-ideal circumstances, approximating ideals might be suboptimal.
Keywords:  argumentation,  ideals,  adversariality,  norms  of  perfection,  second-best
epistemology
Introduction
Consider the following case:
Discussion. Sonia is discussing with Charles. They endorse a different political party for
the ongoing election. Each of them present good evidence for why their favourite party
has the best platform. Sonia has good reason to think that the Socialists will do a better
job at protecting the environment, whereas Charles has good reason to think that the
Conservatives have the best policy for protecting civil rights. Sonia and Charles are not
trying to win the argument. At some point, they even point out some weaknesses of their
own  views:  Sonia  raises  an  objection  against  the  Socialist  platform,  and  Charles
identifies an incoherence in the Conservatives’s promises. However, Sonia is not fully
receptive to Charles’s reasons, and vice versa. They are not fully interested in hearing
each other’s point of view. After a couple of minutes, they stop talking about politics,
and neither of them have substantially changed their mind.
Now, suppose things went differently between Sonia and Charles, as in the following:
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Adversaries. Sonia and Charles still endorse a different party for the ongoing election, and
they  both  have  good  evidence  for  why  their  favourite  party  has  the  best  platform.
However,  Sonia  and  Charles  have  something  to  prove.  They  both  want  to  win  the
argument. So, they listen closely to their opponent’s arguments and reasons, and actively
try to refute them. For strategic reasons, they do not point out the weaknesses of their
own views. Motivated by the fear of losing face, their exchange lasts for an hour, and
they both address many arguments and objections. Towards the end, Sonia raises a series
of excellent arguments against the Conservatives’s platform. Her objections are fatal.
Charles is short of arguments. Humiliated, he revises his belief that the Conservatives
have the best platform.
Were Sonia and Charles more virtuous in Discussion or Adversaries? In Discussion, Sonia
and  Charles  do  not  take  an  adversarial  stance  towards  each  other.  At  first  sight,
adversariality seems like a vicious trait of character. So, there is something to be said in
favour of Discussion. However, in Adversaries, Sonia and Charles are more attentive to
each other’s arguments, and Charles changes his mind after hearing some fatal objections.
Being receptive and responsive to arguments and objections are good traits of character. So,
from a virtue-theoretic point of view, it is unclear whether agents in Adversaries do worse
than in Discussion.
Many theories of argumentation are interested with good argumentation, understood as
an activity between arguers.1 Evaluating arguers and the dialectical activity they engage in
goes beyond the formal aspects of correct arguments, such as cogency, or the presence of
good inferences. For instance, it has been suggested that an ideal arguer possesses virtues—
integrity, open-mindedness, humility or intellectual perseverance, and the like.2 
1 See, for instance, Godden (2016, 345–46). By contrast, some theories of argumentation are interested in
the properties of a good argument, understood as an object or a product. For instance, a good argument is
explicit, cogent and relies on inference principles such as deduction, induction or abduction. Context can
also play a role in determining what counts as a good argument. See Walton (2009) for an overview of the
literature. For classical work and references in argumentation theory, see Blair (2015) on informal logic,
Cohen (1995) on adversarial argumentation and education, Gilbert (2013) on argumentation, agreement
and disagreement,  Hahn and Oaksford  (2007)  on Bayesianism and argumentation,  van Eemeren  and
Grootendorst (2010) on pragma-dialectical approaches to argumentation, Walton (2003) on relevance in
argumentation, and Walton, Reed and Macagno (2008) on argumentation schemes. 
2 See Aberdein  (2016) and Cohen  (2005) on virtue-based argumentation theory. See Cohen and Miller
(2016) on empathy, sympathy and cognitive compathy as features of correct argumentation. See Kidd
(2016) on intellectual  humility as  an intellectual  virtue.  See Kwong  (2016) on open-mindedness and
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This paper analyzes the role of adversariality in virtuous argumentation. It focuses on a
recent debate between Bailin and Battersby (2016) and Stevens and Cohen (2019). Bailin
and Battersby endorse an epistemic account  of argumentation,  which roughly says that
argumentation  aims  at  improving  our  cognitive  system.  We  can  express  Bailin  and
Battersby’s  thesis  in  terms of  ideal argumentation.  Ideally,  arguers should,  after  having
discussed with each other,  have a better  understanding of their  own views, and be in a
better position to reasonably believe various propositions. For them, adversariality plays no
role in ideal argumentation, as cooperation is a better approach for improving our cognitive
systems.  Stevens  and  Cohen grant  that,  if  we focus  on  ideal  arguers  and their  perfect
virtues, argumentation will be cooperative. However, this idealized picture of virtue doesn’t
necessarily matter in non-ideal contexts where imperfect agents argue with each other. In
non-ideal  contexts,  approximating  the  ideal  of  argumentation  might  not  be  virtuous  or
optimal.
While  I  am sympathetic  to  Stevens  and Cohen’s  main  conclusion,  I  think  that  the
relationship between ideal and non-ideal norms is more complicated than it seems. Some
important questions are left unanswered by both camps. First, how do we conceptualize an
ideal  and  its  approximation?  Second,  how  can  we  determine  what  is  the  ideal  of
argumentation? Third, can there be anti-approximation arguments outside virtue-theoretic
accounts of argumentation? 
This paper sheds light on these questions by offering a second-best perspective on ideal
argumentation. The Theory of the Second Best is a formal contribution to the field of utility
(or  welfare)  optimization.  Its  main  conclusion  is  that,  in  non-ideal  circumstances,
approximating ideals might be suboptimal (with respect to a specific interpretation of what
“approximating  an  ideal”  means).  Recently,  authors  like  David  Wiens  (2020)  have
suggested  that  the  formal  model  underlying  the  Theory  can  find  applications  beyond
economics.  So, I  will  present this  model step by step,  and see whether it  can apply to
argumentative virtues. See also Godden (2016) and Stevens (2016).
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optimal  argumentation.  Along the  way,  I  will  shed light  on the  above three  questions.
Specifically, I will make the following claims:
1. There is more than one way to conceptualize an ideal and its approximation;
2. Idealizing does not mean removing all constraints. If we take this idea seriously, the
ideal of argumentation could be adversarial to some degree;
3. The second-best  perspective suggests that there are good reasons not to approximate
ideals even outside virtue-theoretic accounts of argumentation (e.g., in consequentialist
or deontological accounts).
Section 1 summarizes Bailin and Battersby’s argument, Stevens and Cohen’s response,
and the questions left unanswered by both camps. Section 2 argues that there is more than
one way to conceptualize an ideal and its approximation. Section 3 argues that, in a second-
best framework, adversariality can be part of the ideal of argumentation. Section 4 argues
that a second-best framework lends support against the approximation of argumentative
ideals.
The debate between Bailin and Battersby and Stevens and Cohen instantiates a general
problem in ethics, argumentation theory and epistemology, namely, the recourse to ideals.3
A second-best  perspective  allows  us  to  see,  in  accordance  with  Stevens  and  Cohen’s
conclusion, that the approximation of ideals in non-ideal contexts can be suboptimal. But it
also raises interesting conceptual issues concerning the nature of ideals. Ultimately, I hope
this paper will show that the recourse to ideals is more complicated than it seems, and calls
for a closer inspection.
3 See, among others, Aberdein and Cohen (2016), Cohen and Miller (2016), Estlund (2014), Gaus (2016),
Hundleby (2013), Staffel (2019), and Stemplowska and Swift (2012) for recent discussion on the role of
ideals in ethics, epistemology and argumentation theory.
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1. Adversariality and the Ideal of Argumentation
1.1. Bailin and Battersby’s Argument Against Adversariality
According to Bailin and Battersby, argumentation aim at improving our cognitive system
(Bailin and Battersby 2016, 8). This means that agents “inquire in order to reach a reasoned
judgment.” (Ibid., 8) 
Their analysis focuses on the goal of argumentation practices. While some practices
may be structured in an adversarial way, the goal of such practices is to reach reasoned
judgments. For instance, consider courtrooms. In Canadian or American trials, lawyers act
as adversaries who try to win a debate.4 However, the judge’s (or the jury’s) task is to reach
a  reasoned  verdict  on  whether  the  defendant  is  guilty.  Thus,  the  activity  might  seem
adversarial, but the goal of the activity is to reach a reasoned judgment (Ibid., 8). 
A similar point can be made for group deliberation, as they indicate in the following:
In group deliberation, for example, it may be useful to have a participant play
the role of devil’s advocate to discourage groupthink or deferral to the implicit
group  hierarchy  and  to  ensure  that  alternative  arguments  are  given  due
consideration.  Although this  may appear  to be a  case of adversariality,  it  is
really the ideas which are in confrontation. And any arguer is in a position to
offer  such criticisms  and  objections  as  well  as  to  propose  arguments,  offer
supporting arguments, revise arguments, and so on (Ibid., 10).
Although they do not use this vocabulary, we can express Bailin and Battersby’s thesis
in terms of  ideal argumentation. Ideally, arguers should, after having discussed with each
other, have a better understanding of their own views. They should be in a better position to
take  a  justified  stance  towards  the  proposition  under  discussion.  But  if  non-epistemic
factors affected the discussion (such as the need to win the debate), argumentation might
fall short of such an ideal. They write:
In the case of mere winners, that is, when the audience is wrongly persuaded
(unjustifiably persuaded), no one is a winner epistemologically. In the case of
real  winners,  that  is,  when the  audience  is  rightly,  or  justifiably  persuaded,
everyone is a winner epistemologically in that all participants have undergone
4 See Wein (2016, 2) on why there are exceptions to this claim.
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an improvement to their cognitive systems, including those who have changed
their minds (Ibid., 9).
Bailin and Battersby think that a practice’s goal determines what this practice requires.
At  the  end  of  their  paper,  they  write  that  “habits  of  mind  or  virtues  such  as  open-
mindedness, fair-mindedness, and a willingness to follow an argument where it leads can be
seen as... required by its epistemic goals [of cognitive improvement]” (Ibid., 11). In other
words,  ideal  argumentative  practices  aim  at  cognitive  improvement,  and  the  goal  of
cognitive improvement tells us which practices (or habits of mind) are required for good
argumentation.5
1.2. Stevens and Cohen’s Reply
Stevens  and Cohen  grant  that,  if  we focus  on  ideal  arguers  and  their  perfect  traits  of
character,  argumentation will  be cooperative.  They agree that perfectly virtuous arguers
want  to  further  the  aim  of  argumentation,  namely,  cognitive  betterment  of  all  the
participants. They even agree with Bailin and Battersby that specific dispositions, such as
open-mindedness  and reasons-responsiveness,  are  part  of  ideal  argumentative  practices.
(Stevens and Cohen 2019, 5)
However,  this  idealized  picture  of  virtue  doesn’t  necessarily  matter  in  non-ideal
contexts where imperfect agents argue with each other. They say:
The social aspects of argumentation disrupt the apparently analytic connections
between the argumentative  telos and the cooperative stance. The arguers with
whom  we  argue  are  flawed  human  beings;  the  contexts  in  which  we  find
ourselves  arguing  are  full  of  complex  contingencies;  and,  let  us  admit,  we
ourselves  inevitably  fall  short  of  ideal  virtue.  The  easy,  straightforward
analytical  answer  turns  out  to  be  too  easy....  A  normative  theory  of
argumentation  that  provides  guidance  only  for  ideal  people  in  ideal
circumstances hardly is ideal. (Ibid., 6-7)
5 Bailin  and  Battersby  are  responding  to  Cohen’s  paper  titled  “Missed  Opportunities  in  Argument
Evaluation” (Cohen 2015). In this paper, Cohen analyzes missed opportunities in argumentation, such as
failing to notice a good argument in favour of a thesis, or failing to signal it to an opponent. There are
some contexts in which agents who fail to notice or signal a good argument in favour of a thesis are
subject  to  criticism.  However,  there  also  seems  to  be  contexts  in  which  missed  opportunities  are
permitted. Cohen tries to make sense of such a datum by analyzing roles, impartiality, and adversariality
in argumentation.  See Wein (2016) for a reply to Bailin and Battersby’s argument.
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In non-ideal contexts, it can be virtuous to take an adversarial stance towards each other.
For instance, imperfect agents like us are better at finding good arguments and objections
when faced with opponents. That is, we make a better contribution to collective discussion
when “we are set against other reasoners” (Ibid., 8). Here, Stevens and Cohen echo some
observations made by Mercier and Sperber, who write:
Imagine two engineers who have to come up with the best design for a bridge....
Ella favors a suspension bridge, Dick a cantilever bridge.... They can each build
a case for their favored option. Ella would look for the pros of the suspension
bridge and the cons of the cantilever; Dick would do the opposite. They would
then  debate  which  option  is  best,  listening  to  and  evaluating  each  other’s
arguments. To the extent that it is easier to evaluate arguments presented to you
than to find them yourself,  this  option means less work for the same result.
(Mercier and Sperber 2017, 220-1)
The gist of Mercier and Sperber’s point is this: Agents like us (i.e., with our psychological
traits) are not particularly good at evaluating the pros and cons of every possible option.
However,  we  reach  reliable  and  cost-effective  results  in  competitive  setups.  So,  the
adversarial model of argumentation can be relevant in non-ideal contexts, since it makes a
better use of our cognitive capacities.
Here is  another  example.  In  non-ideal  situations  like  ours,  some contextual  factors
can’t be changed. Perhaps in the ideal world, there are no courtrooms, union negotiations,
or  debates  clubs.  In  this  world,  these structures  exist,  and they will  not  disappear  in  a
foreseeable future. These structures embrace the adversarial logic. Arguers who choose a
cooperative stance in  these contexts  would be at  a  great  disadvantage.  As Stevens and
Cohen rightly stress, “one arguer, deviating from the expected norm and staying purely
cooperative because she wants to be virtuous, would destroy the requisite equilibrium and
be  counter-productive  to  the  accomplishment  of  the  argumentative  telos”  (Stevens  and
Cohen 2019, 9).
Thus, Stevens and Cohen grant that, in an ideal world, adversarial argumentation has
no place. But they stress that, in non-ideal settings (like our world), it might be virtuous to
take an adversarial  stance towards  each other  during argumentation.  They indicate  that
virtuous arguers “choose roles that enhance the chances for the epistemic betterment of all,
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given the specific participants and the actual circumstances... certain argumentative tasks
require  certain  argumentative  virtues  more  than  others.” (Ibid.,  14)  So,  suppose  agents
know  that,  in  contexts  C,  cognitive  improvements  are  greater  when  agents  act  as
adversaries. Then, virtuous agents will act as adversaries in contexts C.
1.3. Three Questions Left Unanswered
I  am  sympathetic  towards  Stevens  and  Cohen’s  main  conclusion  (i.e.,  in  non-ideal
conditions, virtuous agents do not necessarily argue as perfect agents in ideal conditions
would). Yet, I think that the nature of ideal norms, as well as the relationship between ideal
and non-ideal norms, are more complicated than it seems. The exchange between Bailin
and Battersby (2016) and Stevens and Cohen (2019) leaves many questions unanswered.
First, how do we conceptualize an ideal and its approximation? Both papers seem to
take an ideal to be defined by a set of features, like (i) all the agents are open-minded, (ii)
all the agents cooperate with each other,  etc. But why not define the ideal differently? In
general, philosophers are not very explicit when it comes to defining ideals.
Second, how can we determine what is the ideal of argumentation? Both papers say
that the ideal of argumentation is collaborative, but it is unclear why we need to accept this.
Perhaps some interpretations of the ideal of argumentation allow for adversariality, even
under the assumption that cognitive improvement is the telos of argumentation.
Third, is Stevens and Cohen’s anti-approximation argument limited to virtue theory?
Part  of  their  argument  is  premised on a  virtue-theoretic  account  of  argumentation.  But
perhaps  approximation  of  ideals  could  make  sense  in  deontological  or  consequentialist
accounts of argumentation.
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A second-best analysis of adversariality and argumentation will provide partial answers
to the above three questions.
2. How Do We Conceptualize an Ideal and Its Approximation?
Approximation claims concerning ideals are ambiguous. There are various ways in which
one can refer to approximating an ideal.6 For instance, consider:7
Approximation in Terms of Closeness. Suppose an ideal is defined in terms of the optimal
value of some variables x1, x2,..., xn. Then, approximating the ideal can refer to getting as
close as possible to the optimal values of x1, x2,..., xn.8
Approximation in Terms of Value. Suppose an ideal is defined in terms of the greatest
amount of value (say, X) one can get out of a given situation. Then, approximating the
ideal can refer to getting an amount of value that is as close as possible to X.9
Approximation of Features. Suppose an ideal is defined in terms of the features or states
of affairs of an ideal world. Then, approximating the ideal can refer to meeting as many
features of the ideal world as possible.10
Approximation of Relationships. Suppose an ideal is defined in terms of the relationships
between variables of an ideal world. Then, approximating the ideal can refer to meeting
as many of the relationships that characterize the ideal world.11
Note that these characterizations are not coextensive. They can conflict with one other.
So, they are not different ways of expressing the same idea. 
6 And  not  all  interpretations  of  approximation  make  sense.  For  instance,  consider  Kwisthout  et  al.'s
discussion of Bayesian modeling in cognitive science. For them, a problem for Bayesian modeling in
cognitive science is computational intractability. Very roughly, the problem is that Bayesian modeling
sometimes proposes solutions that are too costly. The proposed solution cannot be implemented with a
reasonable amount of time and resources. Some reply that Bayesian computations can be approximated
using  inexact  algorithms.  However,  Kwisthout  et  al.  (2011,  780)  doubt  that  this  interpretation  of
“approximation” is mathematically founded.
7 I make the same observations in Daoust (m.s.).
8 See, e.g., Gaus (2016, chap. 1).
9 Some of Staffel's (2019) distance measures also reflect Approximation of Value. See also Gaus (2016,
chap. 1).
10 See,  e.g.,  DiPaolo (2019) and Räikkä  (2000).  DiPaolo and  Räikkä  say that  they are concerned with
second-best problems. However,  The Theory of the Second-Best is concerned with Approximation of
Relationships, not Approximation of Features.
11 See, e.g., Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) and Wiens (2020).
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Consider,  for instance,  Approximation in Terms of Closeness and Approximation in
Terms of Value. Suppose Bob has a blood clot. His welfare is a function of a variable x,
namely, the amount of anticoagulant he receives (in millilitres). The optimal value of x is
10:  Bob  will  be  completely  cured  and  be  in  no  pain  if  he  receives  10  millilitres  of
anticoagulant.  If  he doesn’t  do anything,  he will  be in great  pain,  but  he will  survive.
However, if Bob gets 12 or more millilitres of anticoagulant, he will agonize for hours and
die.  Getting  12  millilitres  of  anticoagulant  is  a  good approximation  of  the  ideal  dose.
However, if Bob got this dose, he would be worse off than if he got no treatment. So, while
x=12 is closer to the ideal value of x (10) than x=0, the disvalue of x=12 is greater than the
disvalue of x=0. Hence, Bob’s case shows that Approximation in Terms of Closeness and
Approximation in Terms of Value can conflict with each other.12
Many philosophers, along with Stevens and Cohen, are interested in Approximation of
Features. They compare the features of ideal worlds with the features of the optimal worlds
available to us, and come to the conclusion that approximating the ideal world might be
suboptimal. Consider the following case. In the ideal world, I would visit my grandma on
Sunday, and I would call her in advance and tell her that I will visit her. Now, suppose that
the ideal world is unavailable to me, but that I have the following options: 
Option 1. (i-) I do not visit grandma and (ii) I call her in advance, telling her that I will
visit.
Option 2. (i-) I do not visit grandma and (ii-) I do not call her in advance to tell her that I
will visit.
Surely, if I am not going to visit grandma, I should not raise her hopes. So, Option 2 is
better than Option 1. However, while Option 1 and the ideal world have one attribute in
common (I call grandma in advance and tell her that I will visit her), Option 2 and the ideal
world have no attribute in common. As we can see, it would be absurd to claim that Option
1 is the best available option just because it is a better approximation, in terms of features,
of the ideal world.
12 See Gaus (2016, chap. 1) for a similar argument.
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By contrast, the Theory of the Second Best is concerned with a different interpretation
of what ideals consist in. The Theory is concerned with Approximation of Relationships. In
accordance with familiar principles found in economics, the Theory starts by identifying a
goal (denoted by a function F), the variables (a, b, c,...) at play for achieving this goal, and
at least one initial constraint limiting its achievement (a function G=0). Then, the Theory
identifies the optimal relationships among the variables.13
For illustration purposes, suppose your goal is to make a good cake. The variables at
play for this goal are the almonds, bananas and chocolate available to you, and you have a
limited budget for buying these ingredients. Then, “F” will be the function of how good
your cake is, it  will be a function of variables (a, b, c), namely, almonds, bananas and
chocolate, and “G=0” will reflect a constraint on your budget for buying the ingredients.
Recall that, for economists, finding ideals is an optimization problem. The problem
consists in figuring out the values of some variables that minimize or maximize a function.
We want to optimize the allocation of resources—that is, we want to find the allocation of
resources that optimizes a given goal. This means that, of the values of a, b and c that
satisfy the constraint, we want to find the ones that optimize our function. In other words,
of the values of a, b and c that satisfy G=0, we want to find the ones that optimize F. 
The method of Lagrange multipliers can be used for finding a function’s optima subject
to  some  constraints,  which  is  exactly  what  economists  are  doing.  Using  Lagrange
multipliers, the optimization of a function F(xi, x2,...xn) subject to a constraint G(xi, x2,...xn)
is given by
F 'i=λ·G' i  i=1,2,... , n  λ≠0
Where  F'i  denotes  the  derivative  of  F  with  respect  to  variable  xi (and  G'i  denotes  the
derivative of G with respect to variable xi), and λ is a constant multiplier.
The method of Lagrange multipliers allows us to express our ideal world in terms of
ratios of derivatives (or,  for simplicity,  ratios of variables).  The ratios are given by the
following:







 i=1 ,2 , ... , n−1
These ratios follow directly from the method of Lagrange multiplier How? Simply divide
F 'i=λ·G' i by F ' n=λ·G' n for i=1,2,... , n−1 , and you get the ratios stated above.
Again, suppose your goal is to make a nice cake (F). As we said, F is a function of
three variables (a, b, c). You need to take a monetary constraint (G=0) into account. Then,













To make a long story short, there is not a unique or canonical way to express ideals and
their approximation. There are at least four different interpretations of what this means, and
they are not coextensive. Some, like Approximation of Features, are fairly common among
philosophers.  Others,  like the above ratios,  are  more  technical  and mirror  optimization
principles found in decision theory. Accordingly, rejecting the approximation of ideals is
more complicated than it seems, since there are many different ways of interpreting what
such  an  approximation  amounts  to.  Perhaps  one  interpretation  of  ideals  and  their
approximation can succeed.
3. How Can We Determine What Is the Ideal of Argumentation?
Bailin and Battersby agree with Stevens and Cohen that the ideal of argumentation is
collaborative.  But  why  think  that?  Depending  on  how we  understand  ideals  and  their
approximation, things get complicated. In a second-best framework, adversariality could be
part of the ideal of argumentation.
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3.1. The Ingredients of A First-Best Scenario
Let’s see how the Theory can provide a new perspective on ideal argumentation. First,
in order to apply the Theory to a given problem, we need at least three elements:
• We want to maximize a function F;
• F is a function of at least three continuous variables;
• F is subject to an initial constraint G.14
Bailin and Battersby (2016, 8) think that virtuous argumentation aims at improving our
cognitive systems, that is, “to inquire in order to reach a reasoned judgment” (Bailin and
Battersby 2016, 8). Stevens and Cohen (2019, 4-5) seem to agree with this assumption.
However, both papers also mention that, as arguers, we want to reach the right answer, or
be accurate (Bailin and Battersby 2016, 9; Stevens and Cohen 2019, 5). So, F could be a
function describing the improvements  of  our  cognitive systems,  or the improvement  of
accuracy.15 Stevens  and  Cohen  suggest  that  these  aims  are  consistent  with  each  other.
Specifically,  having better  cognitive systems is  instrumental  for accuracy: When agents
improve their cognitive systems, they become more accurate. As they say, “arguers will
want to get  [the right answer]...  by being open-minded and reasons-responsive” (Stevens
and Cohen 2019, 5). In view of the foregoing, I will assume that our  ultimate goal is to
maximize accuracy. Being virtuous, improving our cognitive systems, or being reasonable
are means for achieving this final goal.
14 See Wiens (2020, secs. 2–3) and Daoust (m.s.).
15 For full belief, one has an accurate belief in P if and only if one's belief is true. For credence, accuracy
comes in degrees. If P is true, then the more one's credence in P is closer to 1, the more one has an
accurate credence in P. If P is false, then the more one's credence in P is closer to 0, the more one has an
accurate credence in P.
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Now, we need to find at least three variables that matters for optimizing accuracy in
argumentative contexts.16 Here is a tentative list of factors and traits of character that can
improve or reduce accuracy in argumentative contexts:
Ability to provide and respond to reasons (r):  To what degree are agents capable of
processing and responding to their reasons? Do they ignore some of their evidence? Do
they share  all  the  relevant  reasons  they  have?  How well  do  they  reason from their
evidence?
Motivation for winning the  argument and  other  non-epistemic  factors  (w):  Why are
agents engaged in argumentation? Are they trying to figure out the truth of a proposition,
of do they also have other goals, like winning? How important are these other goals—
that is, to what extent are agents motivated by winning?
Interaction and receptiveness among arguers (i): Are agents interacting with each other,
and to what extent? For instance, are agents elaborating their arguments separately, and
letting a third party decide which argument is more plausible? Or do they discuss with
each other, and take into account each other’s arguments and objections? If they discuss
with each other,  to  what  extent  are  they receptive and listen to  what  the others  are
saying?
Most  of  these  variables  can  be  found the  exchange  between Bailin  and  Battersby and
Stevens and Cohen. For instance, Stevens and Cohen (2019, 5) say that perfectly virtuous
agents are reasons-responsive. They also note that adversariality can come in degree (Ibid.,
8). They point out that weak forms of adversariality (where agents care about winning, but
also  care  about  finding  the  truth)  are  less  problematic  than  strong  ones.  Bailin  and
Battersby (2016, 2, 4, 11) stress the importance of cooperation and open-mindedness in
perfect  argumentative  practices,  which  echoes  receptiveness.  They  also  argue  that
competitiveness can undermine the goal of accuracy (e.g., winning the argument doesn’t
16 Why do F and G need to be functions of at least three variables? Recall that the Theory of the Second













. Then, it analyzes cases in which some ratios
of  derivatives  are  satisfied,  while  other  ratios  are  not.  For instance,  if  a  constraint  refrains  us  from
satisfying the first ratio, should we still satisfy the second one? However, if F and G are functions of less
than three variables, you will not have two ratios of derivatives. If you only have two variables, you have
at most one ratio, and the question "if a constraint refrains us from satisfying the first ratio, should we still
satisfy the second one?" makes no sense.
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necessarily entail being right or more reasonable) (Ibid., 2). These variables can also be
found  in  the  broader  empirical  literature  on  argumentation.  For  instance,  Mercier  and
Sperber  (2017,  220–21,  224–27) say  that  interactions  and  adversariality  among  agents
allow for cost-effective argumentation.
I  do  not  want  to  imply  that  only the  above  variables  are  relevant  for  optimizing
accuracy in argumentative practices. Plausibly, there are other variables at play. Traits of
character such as compathy, empathy, and humility could be other relevant variables for
determining how an argument is likely to lead agents to the right answer.17 Yet these three
initial variables will give us a partial picture of ideal argumentation.
These variables can be normalized, i.e., treated as continuous measures ranging from 0
to 1 (Wiens 2020, sec. 3.1). For instance, suppose variables r,  w, and i can take values
between 0 and 1. For instance, if r=0, then agents are absolutely incapable of providing and
responding to reasons, and if r=1, then agents are fully capable to provide and respond to
reasons. Similarly, we can assume that, when w=0, non-epistemic factors like winning the
argument are maximally important, and when w=1, they do not matter at all. Normalizing
the variables simplifies the model without any loss of generality. Various social indicators
are normalized (the Gini coefficient, the Human Development Index, etc.).
If  we normalize  the  range of  possible  values  of  r,  w and i,  we can  locate  various
“idealtypes”18 of  argumentation.  Suppose  (r,  w,  i)  is  a  vector  representing  a  type  of
argumentation determined by some values  of  r,  w,  and i.  Then,  (1,  1,  1)  could be the
idealtype of collaborative argumentation. Agents would greatly interact and be in a position
to provide and respond to reasons, and they would entirely ignore non-epistemic factors.
They would only care about  the truth.  By contrast,  (1,  0,  1) could be the idealtype of
adversarial argumentation. Agents would give maximal importance to some non-epistemic
factors, like winning the argument. There could be other idealtypes. For instance, (1, 0, 0)
17 See note 2.
18 An idealtype refers to a case in which the essential features of a phenomenon are most accentuated. In
accordance with the Weberian tradition, an idealtype can be disvaluable or unethical. There can be, for
instance, idealtypes of dictatorship, corruption, mafia, and so forth.
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could  be the  idealtype of  something called  “non-conversational  argumentation.”  Agents
would try to win the argument by to convincing a third-party (the voters, a judge, a jury,
etc.) that they are right, but they would never interact with their opponent or the third party.
They would limit themselves to making a positive case for their own view.
Finally,  F  could  be  subject  to  an  initial  constraint.  For  instance,  even in  idealized
scenarios,  agents  do not  have an infinite  amount  of  time,  or  they do not  have infinite
cognitive capacities for processing all the reasons and objections they hear, and so forth.
These  types  of  constraints  mirror  the  ones  found  in  economics,  where  ideals  do  not
presuppose that resources are infinite, or that technology is fully advanced. There can be an
ideal division of resources matching the ones we have access to, or an ideal tax structure
relative to the technology within our grasp.19 The same goes for argumentation.
3.2. Some Degree of Adversariality Can Be Part of the Argumentative Ideal
Given what we said in the previous subsection, there is no reason to exclude that the
ideal of argumentation will allow for some degree of adversariality. Given F and constraint
G, assigning a value of less than 1 to w could optimize our function.20 This would mean
that, relative to the initial constraints agents face,  some degree of adversariality (or  some
importance given to winning the argument) can optimize F. 
Suppose, for illustration purposes, that our functions F and G look like the following:
(1) F(r ,w ,i)=(r·w)+(w·i)+(i·r )




Note that functions F and G could be different. In section 4, I will explain how we can
identify second-best problems without knowing the particular functional forms of F and G.
19 Also, think of Kitcher’s (1990) ideal division of epistemic labour. Kitcher roughly says that diversity can
be essential  for  optimizing an  ideal  community’s  division of  epistemic  labour.  But  Kitcher  does not
assume  that  ideal  epistemic  communities  have  access  to  infinite  resources.  He  takes  the  bounded
resources available to an epistemic community as an initial constraint.
20 Recall that, when w=0, non-epistemic factors like winning the argument are maximally important, and
when w=1, they do not matter at all.
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So, we could run the argument without identifying the particular functional forms of F and
G.  I  picked  these  equations  to  give  concrete  support  to  the  claim  that  the  ideal  of
argumentation can allow for some degree of adversariality. 
Let’s take a closer look at the general features of our functions. Begin with F. Every
variable in F contributes to accuracy. That is, all things being equal, an increase in either
variables contributes to overall accuracy. If there were no constraint, optimizing F would
mean that  all  the  variables  take  a  value  of  1.  In  other  words,  if  there  were  no  initial
constraint,  the  collaborative conception of  argumentation would  be optimal.  Bailin  and
Battersby, as well as Stevens and Cohen, would agree with this feature of F.
As for our initial constraint G, it has the following properties: First, it entails that we
cannot fully realize all the variables simultaneously. It is impossible that (w, r, i)=(1, 1, 1).
Think  of  a  context  in  which  agents  lack  the  resources for  being  perfectly  reasons-
responsive,  fully  receptive,  and concerned only  with  truth-related  factors.  Perhaps  they
have a limited amount of time and mental energy to argue with each other, or they cannot
change some facts about their psychology, and so forth. In such contexts, there has to be
some trade-offs between the variables. 
Second, for every increase in the ability of providing and responding to reasons, agents
need to give up something: Either agents will care more about non-epistemic factors, or
they will interact less with each other. Think of Sonia and Charles’s cases discussed in the
introduction. In Discussion and Adversaries, Sonia and Charles are sensitive to arguments
and objections. This could mean that, in both cases, r takes a high value. But in Discussion,
they are not very receptive to each other (and, hence, i takes a low value). In Adversaries,
they give a high importance to winning the argument (and, hence, w takes a low value).
Hence, these cases could illustrate that an increase in r comes at the cost of a decrease in
either i or w.
Using the method of Lagrange multipliers discussed above, we can define our ideal
ratios of variables as follows:





2 i ·w2+0.5 i
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As it happens, our function F reaches its highest point (≈1.218) when our variables take the
following values:
(5.1) (r ,w , i)≈(0.577, 0.668, 0.668)
(5.2) F(0.577,0.668, 0.668)≈1.218
Of course, such values of r, w, and i satisfy the ratios stated in (3) and (4).
Note that variable w, which represents the importance of non-epistemic factors (like
winning), takes a value of less than one (w=0.668). This means that, in order to optimize F,
we gave  some importance to non-epistemic factors. The upshot here is that, under one or
multiple initial constraints like G, the goal of accuracy can be optimized by allowing some
importance to winning the argument. Accuracy through argumentation will be optimized if
agents try, to some extent, to win the argument. So, in a second-best framework, there is no
reason to exclude the possibility that  some degree of adversariality  is  part  of the ideal
scenario. 
Here is another way to put it. Suppose we added one constraint to our model, namely,
w=1.  That  is,  suppose  we  really  wanted  to  make  sure  that  agents  give  absolutely  no
importance to non-epistemic factors. If we make sure that w=1, what is the highest value of
our function F? This amounts to a new optimization problem, with the following additional
constraint:
(6) G2(r , w , i)=1−w=0
In other words, we would optimize F under the constraints stated in (2) and (6). Under such
constraints, our function F is optimized when our variables take the following values:
(7.1) (r ,w , i)≈(0.522, 1, 0.427)
(7.2) F(0.522,1,0.427)≈1.172
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We can then compare (7.2) with (5.2). Without the constraint w=1, our function reached a
higher  point  (e.g.,  1.218>1.172).  In  other  words,  adding  the  constraint  w=1  lead  to  a
suboptimal result.  Thus, in this  particular case,  it  is  better  to allow for some degree of
adversariality.
Once again, to be clear: The equations in (1)-(7.2) merely provide an example of what
the ratios of variables defining an argumentative first-best could look like. I have no reason
to think that these functions F and G are the “real” functions representing the optimization
of accuracy under constraints. And since there are probably other variables that matter for
optimizing F, this is, at best, a partial sketch of our function. But this shows that a first-best
scenario can include some degree of adversariality. All I wish to stress is that, a priori, we
cannot rule out this possibility. 
4. Anti-Approximation Arguments Beyond Virtue Theory
In  this  section,  I  suggest  that  the  Theory  of  the  Second  Best  can  provide  a  general
framework  against  approximation  claims  in  argumentation.  The  framework  doesn’t
presuppose any commitment to consequentialism, deontologism, or virtue theory. It can be
used  in  accordance  with  various  philosophical  doctrines.  For  instance,  economists  use
second-best framework to analyze the distribution of goods optimizing welfare (Lipsey and
Lancaster  1956).  Wiens  (2020, sec.  3) illustrates how the framework can be applied to
Rawls’s (2009) deontological ideals. In the previous section, we used it to shed light on the
balance of argumentative virtues that optimize accuracy. The framework is flexible and can
be used in accordance with different moral theories.
As we saw in section 3,  a  first-best  scenario is  characterized in  terms of ratios of
variables.  For  instance,  the  ideal  argumentative  scenario  could  be  characterized  by  the
ratios stated in (3) and (4). In non-ideal worlds, some of the ideal ratios cannot be satisfied.
For instance, perhaps in this world, we cannot satisfy the ratio stated in (3). Then, we want
to know whether it is optimal (or suboptimal) to satisfy the remaining ratios, like (4). The
Theory says that, in some conditions, it is suboptimal to satisfy the remaining ratios. In
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other words, there are conditions in which, when we cannot satisfy at least one of the ideal
ratios, we are better off not satisfying the remaining ones. What are these conditions?
We can determine whether a function F is subject to second-best problems without
knowing its  particular  functional  form.  As Wiens  (2020,  sec.  3) notes,  a  function F is
subject to second-best problems if the following four conditions are met:
• We want to maximize F;
• F is subject to an initial constraint G;
• F and G are functions of at least three continuous variables;
• Some “separability conditions” are violated in either F or G.
In other words, if the above four conditions are met, it  can be suboptimal, in non-ideal
conditions, to approximate the ratios defining the ideal world. Regardless of their particular
functional forms, if F and G satisfy the above criteria, they will trigger the mathematical
theorem underlying the Theory (Wiens 2020, sec. 3.1).
The first three conditions were discussed in section 3. As we saw, F could be a function
of accuracy. In argumentative contexts, F could a function of at least three variables, such
as responsiveness to reasons, the importance agents give to non-epistemic factors, and the
interaction and receptivity of agents. And insofar as “ideal” is not a synonym of “infinite
resources” or “perfect agents with unlimited cognitive capacities,” F can be subject to an
initial constraint G, such as the resources available to agents.
We already have our first three ingredients for arguing that there can be second-best
problems in argumentative contexts. All we need to know is whether some  “separability
conditions” are violated in either F or G. But what does this mean, exactly?
Nonseparability  is  a  technical  notion.  Here  is  an  accessible  summary  of  what
nonseparability consists in.21 A good sign that functions F(x1, x2,..., xn) and G(x1, x2,..., xn)
are nonseparable is that, in order to optimize F under constraint G, one cannot optimize the
value  of  the  variables  x1,  x2,..., xn independently  of  each  other.  Optimizing  F  under
21 Mathematically speaking, the violation of separability conditions have to do with the system of partial
derivatives that result from optimization in second-best scenarios. See Daoust (m.s.).
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constraint  G  requires  taking  the  value  of  all  the  variables  x1,  x2,..., xn into  account
simultaneously. Think of the following cross effects between variables:
Synergy. Some of the function’s variables have more effect when combined. For instance,
suppose you want to get to work. Gas won’t get you to work. A car with an empty gas
tank won’t get you to work. But a car with gas in it will get you to work. So, cars and
gas are effective (or have more effect) when combined.
Substitution. Some of the function’s variables are substitutes. For instance, suppose you
want to get to work. Since you possess car A, you don’t need car B. However, when car
A is damaged, you might need car B. So, car A and car B are substitutes.
Attenuation. Some of the function’s variables can cancel or attenuate each other out. For
instance, suppose you want to be happy. Driving your car will make you happy, and
drinking alcohol will also make you happy. However, driving your car while drinking
alcohol will make you worse off.
We have good reason to think that some variables in argumentative contexts display
cross effects. Accordingly, we have good reason to think that there are plausible second-
best problems in argumentative contexts. In the remainder of this section, I discuss three
plausible cross effects that we could observe between variables r, w, and i.
4.1. Cross Effects Between Responsiveness to Reasons and Interaction in F
When it comes to optimizing accuracy, there can be cross effects between variables i and r.
Specifically, these variables can be synergetic. Interaction provides new perspectives that
can be beneficial to arguers, in the sense that it allows them to develop better argumentative
schemes. Citing Deanna Kuhn’s  (Kuhn 1991) study on the ability, for isolated agents, to
find arguments and objections in favour of their own point of view, Mercier and Sperber
say:
We  encountered  Deanna  Kuhn’s  study  of  argumentation  demonstrating  the
difficulty  most  people  have  in  finding  counterarguments....  The  same study
showed that even in support of their own point of view, people often give rather
weak arguments. (Mercier and Sperber 2017, 223)
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Then, Mercier and Sperber argue that the same kind of agents (e.g., agents who are not
more knowledgeable, more competent, etc.) do better when they interact with each other.
They write:
The experiments presented earlier, which prompted psychologists to deplore the
poor quality of the reasons put forward by participants, did not take place in a
typical dialogic context. When a normal interlocutor is not swayed by a reason,
she offers counterarguments, pushing the speaker to provide better reasons. An
experimenter, by contrast, remains neutral. She may prompt the participant for
more arguments, but she doesn’t argue back. If reason evolved to function in an
interactive  back-and-forth,  strong  arguments  should  be  expected  only  when
they are called for by an equally strong pushback. (Mercier and Sperber 2017,
227)
The gist  of Mercier  and Sperber’s argument  is  that,  given the facts  of our psychology,
interaction improves our capacity to find good arguments and objections in favour of our
points of views. This suggests that variables i and r display cross effects for optimizing
accuracy in argumentative contexts.
4.2. Cross Effects Between Responsiveness to Reasons and Interaction in G
Naturally, if we take Mercier and Sperber’s argument seriously, coupling i and r can affect
the resources available for arguing with each other. Reasons-responsive agents who interact
with each other have to spend more time and cognitive efforts to process arguments and
objections,  since  they  must  process  new  arguments  and  objections  that  they  would
otherwise not be aware of. 
The  costs  associated  to  combining  interaction  and  reasons-responsiveness  are  not
merely additive. Interaction without argumentation doesn’t cost anything, since agents lack
the  capacity  to  engage  in  any kind  of  reasons-based  exchange.  Argumentation  without
interaction  doesn’t  cost  much,  since  agents  have  a  limited  access  to  arguments  and
objections (i.e., they only have access to their own arguments and objections). But when
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high interaction is combined with high reasons-responsiveness, arguing with each other can
become costly.22
Note, of course, that these costs might very well be worth it. As we saw in the previous
subsection, reasons-responsive agents who interact with each other do a very good job at
finding good arguments and objections in favour of our points of views. So,  for equal
results in terms of accuracy or reasonableness, combining r and i is cost-effective. But this
is compatible with the presence of a cross effect between i and r in terms of costs.
4.3. Cross Effects Between Responsiveness to Reasons and the Motivation for Winning in F
When  it  comes  to  optimizing  accuracy,  combining  responsiveness  to  reasons  and  low
motivation for winning makes agents more likely to present objections and arguments that
do not favour their own views. Since arguers mainly care about the truth, they do not “hide”
arguments and objections. By contrast, when agents care about winning, they do not reveal
objections against their own views, or do not reveal arguments that could be useful for their
opponents. In other words, adversaries waste some of their abilities to provide and respond
to reasons.
Consider  Charles  and  Sonia’s  cases  discussed  in  the  introduction.  In  Discussion,
Charles and Sonia do not care about winning, and they freely discuss objections against
their own views. By contrast,  in Adversaries, they care about winning. If they are well
prepared and they want to increase their chance of winning the argument, they choose to
ignore some objections and arguments favouring their opponent. This is one of the main
differences between Discussion and Adversaries.
So,  there  is  a  plausible  cross  effect  between  responsiveness  to  reasons  and  the
motivation for winning. Improving the ability of  collaborators to provide and respond to
reasons contribute directly to accuracy. By contrast, improving the ability of adversaries to
provide and respond to reasons might not contribute as much to accuracy, since adversaries
do not make full use of their ability to provide reasons.
22 Compare: Driving your car for an hour won’t cost you much. Drinking a bottle a vodka won’t cost you
much. But drinking a bottle of vodka just before driving your car could be extremely costly. Here, the
costs associated with these activities are somehow synergetic.
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4.4. Taking Stock
This partial survey of three possible cross effects between variables r, w, and i suggests that
the separability conditions are violated in either F or G. Accordingly, it can be suboptimal,
in  non-ideal  argumentative  contexts,  to  approximate  the  ratios  defining  ideal
argumentation. This conclusion can be reached without knowing the particular forms of F
and G.
Perhaps you are curious, and you want to know what happens, mathematically, when
the variables in either F or G are nonseparable. So, here is a simple example showing what
can happen. It is based on the equations introduced in section 3.
In section 3, we identified, for illustration purposes, two ratios that could define our
ideal world. To simplify the reading, here they are again: 





2 i ·w2+0.5 i





These ratios define the relationships between our variables in the ideal world.






2 i · w2+0.5 i
If (8) is true, it is impossible to satisfy the first-best ratio stated in (3). However, we could
still satisfy the remaining first-best ratio—namely, the one stated in (4). Should we satisfy
this  ratio?  Is  this  a  good  idea?  To  answer  these  questions,  we  need  to  solve  a  new
optimization problem. In this new problem, we still aim at optimizing F, but this time, we
take both the initial constraint (2) and the additional constraint (8) into account.
Under  such  constraints,  F’s  highest  point  is  ≈1.108.  This  second-best  optimum is
observed when variables r, w and i take the following values:
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(9.1) (r ,w , i)≈(0.328, 0.626, 0.946)
(9.2) F(0.328,0.626, 0.946)≈1.108
That is, (9.1) expresses the values of r, w and i that optimize F under constraints (2) and (8).
However, the values of r, w, and i in (9.1) violate the first-best ratio stated in (4). So, we
could satisfy (4), but this would be suboptimal. Thus, the Theory’s warning applies here: If
we want to optimize a function, like F, in non-ideal circumstances, we sometimes have to
depart from the first-best ratios of variables defining the ideal world. Or: approximating
ideals can be suboptimal. We have reached Stevens and Cohen’s main conclusion, but with
a completely different argument.
5. Conclusion
This paper focused on a recent debate on the relevance of ideals for determining virtuous
argumentative practices. A second-best perspective can shed light on the (ir)relevance of
argumentative ideals for imperfect agents like us.
For Bailin and Battersby, adversariality plays no role in ideally virtuous argumentation
—rather,  it  is  collaborative.  Stevens  and  Cohen  grant  that  ideal  argumentation  is
collaborative, but stress that imperfect agents like us should not aim at approximating the
ideal of argumentation. At least three questions were left unanswered by both camps. A
second-best perspective partially answered them. Here is a summary of the questions and
answers discussed in sections 2 to 4:
1. How do we conceptualize an ideal and its approximation? Response: There is more
than one way to do this. In fact, there are at least four different ways to define what
ideals and their approximation are. Philosophers tend to be interested in the features of
ideal  worlds,  whereas  economists  and  decision  theorists  are  interested  in  the
relationships between variables at play in ideals.
2. How can we determine what is the ideal of argumentation? Response: In a second-best
perspective, the ideal of argumentation is a matter of optimization under constraints.
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Contra Bailin and Battersby, as well as Stevens and Cohen, I cast doubt on the claim
that the ideal  of argumentation is  perfectly collaborative.  There can be some initial
constraints on the ideal scenario. Ideal doesn’t necessarily mean “unlimited resources,”
or  “perfect  agents  with  unlimited  time  and cognitive  capacities.”  If  we  take  initial
constraints seriously, the ideal of argumentation could be adversarial to some degree.
3. Can there be anti-approximation arguments beyond virtue theory? Response: Yes. A
second-best framework shows that, in some conditions, approximation of ideals can be
suboptimal. In section 4, I primarily focused on traits of character optimizing accuracy
(e.g.,  receptiveness,  reasons-responsiveness,  and  cooperation).  However,  the  model
underlying the Theory does not presuppose any commitment to virtue theory. So, when
it comes to argumentation, second-best problems could be identified in deontological or
consequentialist  frameworks,  provided  that  we  identify  relevant  variables  matching
these moral theories.
I hope to have shown that argumentation theorists can appeal to ideals in different ways,
and that defining ideals is no simple task. We should pay closer attention to how we use
ideals in argumentation theory.
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